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‘Marginalize: to put or to keep (someone) in a 
powerless or unimportant position within a society or a 
group.’ While this definition of Merriam-Webster might 
sound static, one must keep in mind that the essence of 
history is nothing but change. Thus, it is for no surprise many 
groups that were initially marginalized finally succeeded in 
making an impact on the flow of events in time. The current 
study focuses on the international group of intellectuals and 
politicians that gathered around the British Great War-era 
periodical of the New Europe (1916–1920). This association 
aimed at the reconstruction of the Old Continent along 
national lines, which they propagated with the notion of 
‘national self-determination’. The revolutionary goals and 
rhetoric of the society initially resulted in a marginalized 
state – but by the end of the war, both the New Europe and 
national self-determination had their breakthroughs and 
thus, their impact on the inter-war settlement.
Everything started in the foggy landscape of the 
early 20th-century Scotland with a young student of 
history: Robert William Seton-Watson, who showed a 
peculiar interest in the whereabouts of the so distant and 
so mysterious Habsburg Empire. Actually travelling across 
the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy between 1905–1910, 
Seton-Watson did not only explore the state itself, but also 
met the representatives of various national elites. During 
this time, Seton-Watson could also get to know the Czech 
politician and intellectual Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk 
(Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 19-40). The two of 
them finding each other marked the start of a grandiose 
project: that of the New Europe, that wielded and produced 
determinative ideas in relation to the settlement after the 
First World War. 
Project: The New Europe 
(1916-1920)
The tour through the realms of the Dual Monarchy 
was a mind-opening one for the Scottish traveller. It 
turned out that most nationalities of the empire – or 
at least their elites – were deeply unsatisfied with the 
current situation, being under the rules of the Austrian 
and Hungarian governments (Jeszenszky, 1987:20-21). 
Being sympathetic to the cause of a monarchy of shared 
interests, Seton-Watson initiated a project that gained 
great importance in the future. The Scottish intellectual 
planned to start a quarterly review to provide more 
details upon these matters and to gain the support of 
the Western public for various national movements. The 
project was running under the title The European Review; 
as for the provisional list of collaborators, many of Seton-
Watson’s friends from the Monarchy appeared on them.1 
However, the actual publication of The European Review 
was cancelled due to the outbreak of the First World War 
(Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 98-99).
This latter change of revolutionary nature in 
international politics influenced Seton-Watson towards 
new directions – or to be more precise, it happened due the 
impact of his October meeting in Rotterdam with Masaryk 
that the Scottish intellectual devoted himself to the cause 
of destroying the ancient empire of the Habsburgs (Seton-
Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 101-102, 111). The Czech 
politician himself demanded only the equalization of 
nations in Austria–Hungary until 1914 – however, he opted 
for Czech independence after the start of the Great War. 
In order to gain external support for this goal, Masaryk 
established the intelligence service and propaganda 
organization of the so-called ’Maffie’. The Czech leader also 
utilized important connections back from the pre-war era, 
Seton-Watson being one of them (Neville, 1919-1923: 
7, 21). Meeting the Scottish intellectual in Rotterdam, 
Masaryk presented his new dream: the formulation of a 
new state comprised up from the historical crown lands 
of Bohemia and the areas of Northern Hungary inhabited 
by the Slovaks – in other words, the future Czechoslovakia 
(Neville, 1919-1923: 24).
1 The prospects of The European Review can be found in: Seton-
Watson Collection (hereafter cited as SEW), UCL School of 
Slavonic and East European Studies, box 2/2, fold. 1.
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Emigrating from the Habsburg Monarchy in 
late 1914, the Czech politician finally decided to move 
to London in September 1915. The Czech politician 
– possessing knowledge on the earlier project of the 
European Review – started to agitate his Scottish friend 
to found a new ’weekly’ as soon as he arrived to Great 
Britain. Masaryk emphasized the necessity of this with the 
need of counter-weighting the influence of the so-called 
‘Austrophile’ voices. Furthermore, he also argued that the 
hesitant attitude of the British government towards the 
Habsburg Empire made the appearance of a firm political 
voice arguing against the existence of the latter necessary.2
The old-new idea – now gaining the name The New 
Europe – found influential supporters in the figures of the 
journalist Henry Wickham Steed (Thompson, 1999: 169-
170), the archaeologist Ronald Burrows and the British 
Liberal MP A. F. Whyte. With them joining the duo of 
Seton-Watson and Masaryk, five individuals composed 
the basis of the team behind the periodical (Hanak, 1961: 
373-376). As for the supporting crew of ‘collaborators’, 
members of separatist national movements from the 
Habsburg Empire, but also intellectuals and politicians 
from Great Britain, Japan, the United States, France, Italy, 
Russia and Serbia published on the pages of the newspaper 
(Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 439-441). To sum it 
up, both the process of foundation and the actual network 
of the New Europe were of a truly international nature.
When it comes to its actual appearance, the opening 
number of the weekly was published on 19 October 1916. 
According with to its letter of introduction, the New 
Europe first of all intended to observe the framework of 
foreign and war politics and to provide all the inter-related 
information to the public (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 
1916: 1). The press organ also intended to rally those who 
aimed at the future re-organization of Europe on the basis 
of nationality, minority rights and the correction of state 
borders with respect to economic and geographic details 
(The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 1).
The crew of the newspaper tried to initiate this 
course of revolutionary changes not from below, but from 
the upside. Consequently, the main audience aimed at were 
the politicians and other key figures in the countries of the 
Entente (May, 1961: 53). Thus, the New Europe appeared 
not only in Great Britain, but also in Italy, France and the 
United States (Hanak, 1961: 394). The association actually 
tried to interfere in contemporary political mechanisms 
and to utilize an opinion of constructive criticism in 
relation to governmental acts.3 However, with its focus 
2 Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 2 May and 22 August 1916. 
SEW, box 17/16, fold 6.
3  Seton-Watson, letter to Dr. Prothero, 23 October 1916.
being on the former area, the staff of the New Europe 
also tried to shake up the British public opinion from its 
traditional apathy towards the outside world by informing 
it about the less known areas of the European continent 
(Hanak, 1961: 375).
The innovative newspaper gained widespread 
popularity shortly after the publication of its first volume. 
Positive critiques were voiced from the sides of the Times, 
the Observer, the Spectator, the Punch and the New York 
Times (May, 1961: 53). In other words, audiences in Great 
Britain and the United States greeted the New Europe with 
enthusiasm.
However, negative judgements were not absent 
either. The main accusation from the side of critiques 
was that the group of the periodical neglected British 
interests for the sake of their ’mania’ to re-draw the map 
of Europe (Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 282-283). 
The hostility towards the New Europe also took a material 
form in the field of British politics. While he was physically 
incapable to perform his duties in the army, authorities 
suddenly called Seton-Watson into service in March 
1917. It turned out later that it was the Liberal MP Joseph 
King who initiated this act, hoping to marginalize the 
stroppy group of the newspaper (Messinger, 1992: 165).
However, all the ill will fired soon back as it was the 
Department of Information, the British intelligence service 
that employed Seton-Watson. Upon his entrance, familiar 
faces welcomed the Scottish intellectual as many of his 
colleagues at the New Europe had already worked in the 
same office (Sanders, Taylor, 1982: 82). It is no wonder that 
the co-editor of the newspaper, George Glasgow described 
this development retrospectively as the ’conquest’ of the 
Department of Information by the group of the periodical 
(Hanak, 1961: 394) – the latter gaining rich opportunities 
to collect information and to represent its cause.
Due to the gained advantages, the propaganda 
campaign of the association could reach its peak in 1918. 
In addition to this, the last year of the war also saw the 
establishment of the British Department of Enemy 
Propaganda under the press baron Lord Northcliffe 
in February. As indicated in its name, the organization 
aimed at producing material to exercise an effect on 
the populations of hostile countries. Naturally, Austria–
Hungary was also a target – with the related section headed 
by Steed and supervised by Seton-Watson. In other 
words, the thoughts endorsed by the New Europe could 
finally form an important basis of British propaganda and 
the group could gain adequate weight in order to press the 
government to move closer to their aims (Sanders, Taylor, 
1982: 89-92) (Messinger. 1992: 171).
In November 1918, the Entente finally triumphed 
in the war – in parallel to this, the Habsburg Empire fell 
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apart due to its defeat. Thus, the New Europe had a new 
task to prepare for: to make an impact on the decisions 
of the Peace Conference of Versailles. And indeed: while 
Seton-Watson was present as an expert of the British 
delegation, Masaryk could star as the founder of the 
brand-new state of Czechoslovakia. However, the final 
victory of the New Europe was preceded by four years of 
struggle – for the triumph of a principle: that of ‘national 
self-determination’. In fact, the association made great use 
of the famous notion – earlier than the most famous Great 
War-factors, but not without external influences. 
‘National Self-determination’ 
Before and During the First World 
War
While public opinion usually connects the famous 
Great War-era notion of nationalism to the emblematic 
figure of the American President Woodrow Wilson, ‘self-
determination’ actually had a long pre-history even 
before the First World War. The American scientist 
professor Karl Shoemaker successfully showed this in 
his article titled World War I, Self-Determination, and the 
Legacies of Medieval Jurisprudence – published in a 2014 
issue of Turkish periodical Uluslararasi Suçlar ve Tarih 
(International Crimes and History). Shoemaker traced 
back the origins of the theory to the Christian concept of 
state sovereignty in the late Middle Ages. As a further step 
of development, the Enlightenment introduced the reason-
based interpretation of the rights of ’nations’ in natural 
law. Finally, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini – the Italian 
jurist and statesman of the 19th century – advocated that 
instead of states, national communities should form the 
new basis of international legal order (Shoemaker, 2014: 
61-70).
According to the analysis of Denis Mack Smith, the 
self-determination of nations also formed the essential core 
of Giuseppe Mazzini. After the Great French Revolution 
that emancipated individual liberty as an international 
right, the Italian revolutionist waited for another radical 
turn for the sake of national liberty (Smith, 1669: 11-
15). The late influence of Mazzini on the development 
of the self-determination should not be undervalued. As 
Stefano Racchia and Nadia Urbinati stressed in their 
introduction written to A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: 
Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building 
and International Relations (2010), the thoughts of the 
Italian politician had a deep impact on Woodrow Wilson 
(Racchia, Urbinati, 2010: 1-3).
However, the influence of self-determination was 
not restricted merely to the spheres of mentality: the 
concepts also made its way to the international politics of 
the long 19th century. The Constituent Assembly of France 
during the Great Revolution already stood firmly against 
the idea of deciding in territorial questions without the 
involvement of inhabitants. The various stages of Italian 
unification between 1848–1870 made practical use of 
this thought as they were always legitimized by local 
plebiscites – in accordance to the Mazzinian principles 
(Qvortrup, 2015: 550-551). By utilizing the notion of self-
determination, the Great Powers also legitimized and 
helped the secessionist movements of the Balkan peoples 
against the Ottoman Empire (Shoemaker, 2014: 61, 70).
It was of great importance that on the eve of 
the Great War, the Leftist parties of the great Eastern 
states – the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia – engaged 
in a fierce debate about the notion. While the Austro-
Marxist Otto Bauer utilized self-determination in order 
to argue for the federalization of the Habsburg Empire 
means of extraterritorial national autonomy, the Russian 
Bolshevik Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov – better known by 
Robert William Seton-Watson
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his pseudonym ’Lenin’ – understood the term as a right 
of ‘national territories’ to secede from the empire. Thus, 
Lenin essentially accepted that the multi-ethnic structures 
of the East would break up with the utilization of the 
notion – which view gained huge importance soon enough 
with the developments of the First World War (Zoltan, 
1999: 100-101).
Up until 1917, the traditions of the 19th century 
quite dominated the political matches of the Great War. 
Both the sides of the British–French–Russian Entente and 
the Central Powers led by Germany and Austria–Hungary 
designed their infamous plans of war aims and secret 
treaties with these in mind; as opposed to the power 
struggle, the opinion of ordinary citizens had little of an 
importance. As surprising as it might be, it was the Tsarist 
Russia, the most conservative of all Great Powers to bring 
a change into these schemes. As Erez Manela pointed it 
out in his fundamental work The Wilsonian Moment, the 
main watershed was the revolution of February 1917. On 
April 9, the so-called Provisional Government announced 
that it rejected the ‘imperialist’ ideas of rule and conquest. 
As opposed to these, the new establishment of Russia 
propagated the self-determination of peoples as a its new 
guideline for politics – due to the influence of the Leninian 
Bolsheviks (Manela, 2007: 37).
The Bolshevik coup d’état of November 1917 made 
a further step in the subject in accordance to their pre-war 
ideas with the proclamation titled The Rights of Peoples of 
Russia to Self-Determination, issued in a mere week after 
their take-over. The American scientist Betty Miller 
Unterberger also argued in her book The United States, 
Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (1989) 
that in addition to the declaration of self-determination as 
a right of nations to political independence, Lenin and his 
associates also adhered that a system of cultural rights 
should be established for national minorities (Unterberger, 
1989: 83-84).
As for their main goal, the new leadership of Russia 
aimed at a worldwide revolution – and national self-
determination was utilized as a tool for the achievement of 
their ideals. This way, the Bolsheviks could attempt to gain 
the support of minorities in the Russian Empire along with 
those of the oppressed populations all around the World – 
a quite considerable force in the era of colonialism. Thus, a 
serious challenge awaited the answer of the contemporary 
Great Powers situated in the opposing camps of the war 
(Manela, 2007: 37).
As shown by Borislav Chernev, the Russian author 
of the article The Brest-Litovsk Moment in a 2011 volume 
of Diplomacy & Statecraft, those were the Central Powers 
proved to be the ones to be quick and clever enough to react 
first. Germany and the Habsburg Empire actually adopted 
the language of self-determination and used it against the 
original adherents when voicing their demands to Russia 
on the peace negotiations of Brest-Litovsk. Naturally 
though, the Central Powers demanded the utilization of 
the idea only in relation to the nationalities of the Russian 
Empire – and not to those of their own (Chernev, 2011: 
372). The upcoming treaty of Brest-Litovsk marked a real 
revolutionary change as a consequence, being the first 
international contract to be signed on the basis of self-
determination - Tryvge Throntveit emphasized this 
with a right in his article The Fable of the Fourteen Points 
(Throntveit, 2011: 458).
As opposed to the Bolshevik government and the 
Central Powers, the leading states of the Entente – Great 
Britain, France and the allied United States – became 
gravely handicapped. Popular support at home, reliance of 
alliances and stability of colonial rule: all were at stake due 
to the winds of change. Thus, a reaction to the condensing 
smoke signals coming from the East was a must.
The Entente did indeed give an answer to all these 
challenges on 5 January 1918 – or to be more precise, the 
British Prime Minister Lloyd George did so. As interpreted 
by by Throntveit, the Western politician adopted the 
language of self-determination in order to counteract 
the dangerous poison of Bolshevik influence. During the 
course of this dangerous game, Lloyd George applied the 
notion both to the territories and the populations subject 
to the hostile forces and to the British Dominions as well 
(Throntveit, 2011: 459).
Thus, it was only after earlier international 
developments that the American President Woodrow 
Wilson announced his support of national self-
determination – not in the famous Fourteen Points of 
January 18, but in the less known Four Points of February 
11. It must be emphasized that this interpretation of 
self-determination had other sources than the already 
discussed wartime impacts. As shown by Manela, the 
republican ideas of individual rights, Anglo-American 
liberal tradition and the Monroe Doctrine all influenced 
this development (Manela, 2007: 23-24).
In fact, Wilson had already advocated the idea of 
self-determination in 1898, in connection to the islands 
of the Philippines freshly annexed by the United States as 
a consequence of a war of with Spain. The events of the 
Great War ‘only’ added further importance to this idea of 
the politician – now leading a strong neutral country as its 
President. Desiring to have a say in the course of the First 
World War, Wilson introduced the notions ’government 
by consent’, ’equality of nations’ and ’international co-
operation’ to the World as the fundamental basis of his 
vision in his ’Peace without Victory’ speech of January 
1917. Manela emphasized it that the powers of the Old 
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World took this as a direct challenge to their establishment 
– as a consequence, they flatly rejected the ideas adhered 
by the fire-eater American reformist. The situation only 
changed due to the United States entrance into the First 
World War in April 1917 and the already discussed 
revolution at the turn of 1917/18 (Manela, 2007: 16).
When it comes to this final announcement, Wilson 
finally approved the ‘government by consent’ in case of 
those national communities with  ‘well-defined aspirations’ 
(Manela, 2007: 14-42). This definition, however, was 
an unstable and vague one; thus, it provided grounds 
for countless interpretations ever since the American 
President’s announcement of early February. Thus, a lot of 
tensions were created between various states and nations 
– while in many cases, both parties were followers of the 
same thought (Throntveit, 2011: 425-426).
When it comes to the actual notion of ’nation’, the 
Wilsonian interpretation was a term based on popular 
sovereignty. Manela stressed that while Wilson borrowed 
the actual notion of ’self-determination’ from the 
Bolsheviks, he applied it to state populations intentionally 
to oppose to the ethnic approach to the latter (Throntveit, 
2011: 42). In constract, Lynch considered the same 
phenomenon as an outcome of the influence of American 
civic nationalism on Wilson (Lynch, 2002: 424).
In opposition to his first standpoint, Wilson finally 
shifted from to an ethnic understanding of national 
self-determination due to the exigencies dictated by 
the wartime situation. Magda ÁDÁM showed in her The 
Versailles System and Central Europe that as all hopes in 
the multi-ethnic empires of Eastern Europe fell down with 
the Russian Revolution and the Habsburg Empire losing 
independence to its German ally, the creation of nation-
states proved to be the only alternative left for the Entente 
(Adam, 2003: 4-14). And as infamously imperfect the 
creation proved to be, it was still Wilson who achieved the 
widespread acceptance of ‘self-determination’ – that left 
its mark on the settlement of Versailles after the war. Thus, 
Manela described the turn of 1918/19 as the ‘Wilsonian 
Moment’ with a right.
However, it was also the author of the same-titled 
book who stressed that the idea of self-determination lived 
a life on its own in the Great Britain of the Great War as a 
concept adhered by Liberals and Leftists well before 1918. 
Manela connected this to the influence of the Wilson 
(Manela, 2007: 36-39). In contrast to this, British historians 
Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson stated that
[The New Europe] was ’Wilsonian’ long before 
Wilson himself  (Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson, 1981: 195).
The American historian Paul Latawski also 
identified London as one of the main centres of the self-
determination discourse in the Great War and the circle 
of the New Europe as an especially eager receptive of the 
notion (Latawski 1990: 94). The related discourse of the 
press organ, however, had to be integrated in a whole set 
of ideas and concepts.
The New Europe, the ‘Principle 
of Nationality’ and Self-
Determination
Soon after the Great War broke out in 1914, the 
public opinion of Great Britain saw the declaration of 
the so-called ’principle of nationality’ from the journalist 
C. Ernest Fayle, the leading articles of the Manchester 
Guardian and the Morning Post. The latter parties made 
use of the notion to argue for the dissolution of the 
hostile Habsburg Monarchy in accordance to its national 
units (Hanak, 1961: 43). Late scientific literature usually 
equates the principle of nationality to self-determination 
and handles the former as a synonymous term that 
appeared earlier during the course of the First World War 
(Latawski, 1990: 87) (Regan, 1996: 129).
However, I argue that while they had their 
connections, one could identify fundamental differences 
between the two notions – and I can show evidence for 
this argument in the image of the leading article of the 
New Europe on 17 October 1918. The writing Our Peace 
Terms was a draft of declaration proposed for the Entente 
for the moment of victory, with its co-writers - Burrows, 
Steed and Seton-Watson – expecting the Allied powers 
to state
2.  That [the consent of the governed] necessarily 
involves the right of every national unit to control its 
own destinies, and to decide its State-allegiance (self-
determination).
3.  That the principle of nationality is a vital factor 
in the European political situation, and the satisfaction of 
legitimate national aspirations must precede the creation 
of an international order (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 
1916: 30-31).
As for myself, I see the separate mentioning of the 
‘principle of nationality’ and ‘self-determination’ as not a 
means to avoid the repetition of words, but as a sign of 
distinction between the notions. In order to justify this 
view, I will look at the related discourse of the New Europe.
As for the principle of nationality, the Russian 
statesman Vladimir Kovalevsky was the first to announce 
his views on the matter in the issue of 2 November 
1916. The politician adhered that nationalism produced 
fundamental tensions in Europe and thus contributed to 
the out-break of the First World War. As a consequence, 
the new settlement of the future had to yield to this power 
without compromises in order to secure permanent peace 
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for the troubled Old Continent (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 
3, 1916: 79-81).
In the next issue, the article The Reorganization of 
Europe – most possibly written by Masaryk – added an 
important aspect to this explanation: that of democracy. 
According to the author of the writing, the countries of 
the Entente fought as a federation of free nations for 
the ’democratic principle of nationality’ – in contrast 
to the Central Powers that represented the archaic and 
disgustful spirits of brutal centralism and absolutism (The 
New Europe, Vol. I, No. 4, 1916: 101). The lines of Wanted 
– A Foreign Policy (4 December 1916) unfolded this idea 
further, adhering that the reconstruction after the war 
should not be built on the basis of forceful conquests (The 
New Europe, Vol. I, No. 9, 1916: 263).
Developing this argumentation further, it was 
stressed in the leader of the 18 January 1917 issue (The 
Allies’ Programme) that the new settlement must count 
with the rights of nations to an independent development 
on their own – however, the principle of nationality was 
not mentioned for a single time in connection to this. Steed 
and Seton-Watson mentioned the latter only as a process 
formative, yet not emancipated in the field of international 
politics. In contrast to Kovalevsky, the British authors 
also stated that political, religious and economic factors 
might have an equal or even a bigger weight with respect 
to the future settlement than that of nationality4 (The New 
Europe, Vol. II, No. 14, 1917: 2-3).
The March article of Hugh A. Law also utilized a 
similarly confusing mixture of democratic and national 
ideas dealing with the topic of Ireland. The author 
demanded that the principle of nationality and the universal 
rights of liberty should be respected in connection to this 
dominion of Great Britain – in other words, he stressed 
‘self-government’ should be given to the Irish (The New 
Europe, Vol. II, No. 21, 1917: 236).
Besides ’self-government’, other synonymous 
expressions to  ’self-determination’ also appeared in 
the New Europe – with Woodrow Wilson being one 
of the sources. Steed’s and Seton-Watson’s The Allies’ 
Programme, an article commenting on the Entente’s 
answer on 10 January 1917 to Wilson’s ’Peace without 
Victory’ speech, held the view that nations should be free 
to control their destinies (The New Europe, Vol. II, No. 14, 
1917: 2). The February 1 issue interpreted this as a right 
or ’liberty’ of choice – this time, connecting this opinion 
directly to the American President (The New Europe, Vol. 
II, No. 16, 1917: 79). On the other hand, an additional 
source on the question appeared on March 29 – in the 
4 As for the question of authorship, see Seton-Watson and Seton-
Watson, 191.
image of an ‘unnamed’ Russian Socialist after the victory 
of the February Revolution in Russia, who asserted every 
nation should have the possibility to decide on its own fate 
(The New Europe, Vol. II, No. 24, 1917: 340).
After more than half a year was dominated by the 
principle of nationality, the notion of self-determination 
finally entered the pages of the newspaper in April 
1917. The article titled Poland’s Freedom in the April 5 
issue welcomed the developments made by the regime 
established during the February Revolution of Russia. ’Self-
determination’ as such was mentioned for the first time; 
as for its meaning, it was explained as being equivalent 
to the nation’s rights to unity and to exercise power to 
determine its own future through democratic means (The 
New Europe, Vol. II, No. 25, 1917: 380-381).
In fact, this writing displayed two peculiar features 
about the self-determination discourse of the New Europe. 
Firstly, the Poland’s Freedom was actually published before 
the Russian proclamation of April 9 that advocated the 
principle openly for the first time during the Great War – 
which, as a matter fact, showed the deeply knowledgeable 
nature of the group on the news of Eastern Europe. 
Secondly, the association of the press organ clearly and 
directly connected an international break-through to the 
first revolution of Russia – not to the later examples of 
Lenin and Wilson.
This ’Februarian’ viewpoint was held strongly by 
the group of the newspaper, as shown by a memorandum 
(Self-Determination / The Self-Determination of Nations) 
produced during the course of 1917. The anonymous 
author of the writing stated that ‘New Russia’ placed 
the ideological struggle of the war on a new level. They 
also emphasized that the Western Powers of the Entente 
needed to acknowledge the idea of self-determination. In 
addition to this, the author advocated that the principles 
of democracy should be favoured as opposed to secret 
treaties and the selfish interests of power.5
In contrast to their friendly approach to the policy 
of the First Russian Revolution, the collaborators of the 
New Europe criticized the Bolsheviks for ‘misusing’ the 
idea of self-determination. Alex Leeper – the expert of 
Russian topics as indicated by his pseudonym ’Rurik’ – 
stated rightfully that the ideology of the former negated 
nationalism in the end, aiming for a socialist world-
revolution. Therefore, the Bolshevik utilization of self-
determination was nothing more than a ’mere idle phrase’6 
(The New Europe, Vol. V, No. 57, 1917: 199).
5 Self-Determination / The Self-Determination of Nations. SEW, box 
3/3 fold. 2.
6 As for the equality between ’Rurik’ and Alex Leeper, see Hanak, 
„The New Europe”, 371.
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As for the twisted adaptation of the concept by the 
Germany and Austria–Hungary, Seton-Watson set up an 
interesting scheme. The Scottish intellectual pointed it 
out rightfully that self-determination was not applied to 
those nationalities that inhabited the realms of the hostile 
empires. However, he also announced that in fact, the 
governments of the Central Powers understood the notion 
not as one valid for peoples, but for state structures (The 
New Europe, Vol. VI, No. 68, 1918: 75-76).
It seems like ’state’ was actually a counter-concept 
to that of ’national self-determination’ within the 
framework of the New Europe – as shown by the critiques 
of both the Central Powers, but also the approaches of 
Wilson and Lloyd George to the Habsburg question in 
early 1918. As the Entente politicians made use of the new 
idea but did not preach the need of destroying the hostile 
Eastern empire, their opinions were labelled as dangerous 
’half-solutions’ as opposed to the actual will of local 
nationalities inhabiting the Eastern state by the authors 
of the New Europe (The New Europe, Vol. VI, No. 68, 1918: 
91-92).
On the other hand, while the mentioning of ’self-
determination’ was only occasional between April–
November 1917 and became a bit more frequent from 
the Bolshevik coup d’état on, the policies of Lloyd George 
and Woodrow Wilson meant a breakthrough from 
this aspect. From 10 January 1918 on, the notion was 
mentioned in every issue. Thus, it can be concluded that 
while the New Europe group was being attentive towards 
the application of self-determination was used by First 
Revolution of Russia, started to be keen on the subject 
with the revolution of November and could not take their 
eyes of it from the beginning of the last war-year on.
However, the heavy discussion on self-
determination did not mean that the principle of 
nationality would have disappeared from the pages of the 
newspaper – although its usage became extremely rare 
from April 1917 to January 1919. In fact, one could have 
realized that self-determination merged on the side of the 
principle of nationality, but not as its substitute in the New 
Europe. An interview with the Russian Socialist Georgi 
Plekhanov was extremely exciting in connection to this: 
the politician talked about the ’right of nations to dispose 
of themselves’ – in other words, self-determination – as 
the application of the principle of nationality in its most 
democratic form (The New Europe, Vol. IV, No. 44, 1917: 
159). Based on this statement, I argue that the principle 
of nationality was seen as a general scheme of European 
reconstruction strictly connected to the national approach 
– the democratic elements were later attachments to this. 
In contrast, self-determination was applied to individual 
units and was intertwined with the idea of democracy 
from the beginning. It is also important to emphasize once 
more that the New Europe adopted the latter notion not 
from Lenin, Wilson or even George Lloyd, but from the 
discourse of the first Russian Revolution. Furthermore, 
the group of the periodical also had a peculiar area of 
application when it comes to self-determination: that of 
‘Central Europe’.
In the Focus: ‘Central Europe’
An ambitious choice of name and aspirant aims of 
re-organization, coupled with the conditions set up by the 
war-time situation: as a consequence, it was only natural 
that New Europe group adhered their ideals mainly 
against the Central Powers. And indeed: the ’new Europe’ 
in its real, material form had to be built on the ruins of 
Germany, Austria–Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and 
Bulgaria defeated by the Entente.
In fact, the society strived to start and utilize a 
counter-project to the German plans of building the 
imperial sphere of Mitteleuropa (’Central Europe’). The 
first leader of the newspaper – the Pangermanism and 
the Eastern Question of Masaryk – adhered that the latter 
was a combination of Germany’s wartime alliances and 
conquests. On this basis, the rulers of the Reich aimed 
at nothing less but the subjugation of the Old Continent, 
Africa and Asia (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 15). In 
reality, the German government did not pursue the goal of 
becoming a ’world-power’ - ’only’ that of becoming equal 
to Great Britain and Russia (Smith, 1986: 172); however, 
even the most ignorant citizens of the United Kingdom 
could not have turned away their heads from such a threat.
It was due to the influence of Masaryk that the 
New Europe actually adopted and utilized the German 
term of ’Central Europe’ as a spatial notion (Nolte, 1995: 
12). While no precise definitions appeared on the pages 
of the newspaper in connection to this expression, other 
wartime writings related to the group did circumscribe 
this area. For example, Masaryk equated this area to ’the 
East of Germany, Austria – Hungary, the Balkans and the 
Eastern part of Russia (Poland)’ [sic!] in the memorandum 
At the Eleventh Hour of 1916.7
The Czech politician described the problems of this 
area as the formative ’Eastern Question’ of Europe (The 
New Europe, Vol. I, No. 9, 1916: 272-273) – once again, 
re-using an already existing expression that had been 
connected to the troubled situation of the Balkans during 
the long 19th century (Hayashi, 2007: 4). Defining a conflict 
area determinative to the future of the Old Continent, the 
aim of the New Europe group was to untie this Gordian Knot 
7  At the Eleventh Hour. SEW, box 2/3 fold. 3, 29.
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of problems through the peace settlement after the Great 
War. Masaryk’s The Reorganization of Europe specifically 
identified the Southern Slav, Romanian, ’Bohemian’, Polish, 
Ruthenian and Italian national movements as sources of 
various political questions waiting for solutions – and 
creating various kinds of difficulties in the making of the 
’new Europe’8 (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 4, 1916: 102).
Consequently and naturally, the multi-ethnic and 
hostile Habsburg Empire was entirely within the focus of 
the New Europe. However, the Western and especially the 
British public traditionally identified the ancient realm as 
a necessary element in the network of European relations 
– the idea that it should be destroyed was too wild to be 
accepted before 1918 (Zbynek, Klimek, 1997: 21). The 
same was true when it comes to the policy of the Entente 
as shown by the hesitant attitudes of Wilson and Lloyd 
George towards the question. This was to be combated by 
an excessive campaign of propaganda from the side of the 
New Europe.
As for a start, Masaryk argued already in the first 
leader that the past and the present of the Monarchy was 
one of absolutism, centralism and oppression. However, 
the Czech politician relied not only on emotional impacts 
but also the strategic considerations of the war – thus, 
he stressed the importance of Austria–Hungary in the 
German plans of imperialism (The New Europe, Vol. I, 
No. 1, 1916: 10-15). This was unfolded this further in 
the Reorganization of Europe: Masaryk described the 
Dual Empire both as an enormous source of manpower 
and as providing fundamental strategic connection to 
the Balkans, Asia and Africa (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 
4, 1916: 100). It was only a logical consequence that the 
ancient Habsburg Empire had to be destroyed for once 
and all for the sake of the Entente’s interests.
The principle of nationality and self-determination 
were also effective weapons in the struggle against the 
very existence of Austria–Hungary: the application of the 
former idea was obviously equivalent to the dissolution 
of the multi-ethnic empire, while the latter showed the 
coinciding will of local nationalities. As the author of 
the article Le Paix Integrale stressed that in early 1918: 
nothing could have blocked the peoples’ determination 
to secede from the Monarchy – if the Great Powers of 
the Entente would not have accepted their separation, 
then they would have torn the Habsburg Empire apart by 
means of civil war (The New Europe, Vol. V, No. 65, 1918: 
386-387).
However, while it was easy to argue against the 
existence of the Monarchy, the questions brought up by 
8  The article also mentioned the problems concerning the Danish 
and French nations – which, however, were not parts of the 
Central Zone or Central Europe.
the activities of the local Great Powers allied to Great 
Britain created a more complex group of problems. For 
instance, while being oppressive in terms of national 
policy towards its minorities, the topics of Russia were 
to be treated carefully by the New Europe (Seton-Watson, 
Seton-Watson, 1981: 196-197). As a consequence, the 
group could not support the otherwise sympathetic 
cause of Polish independence until the fall of Czarism – as 
stressed by Seton-Watson in 1916.9 It is for no surprise 
that the authors of the New Europe celebrated the Eastern 
empire’s later endorsement of self-determination loudly.
On the other hand, the yet-to-be-fulfilled national 
movements also announced excessive territorial claims 
that opposed the principle. For example, the Romanian 
government voiced demands in relation to the Hungarian-
inhabited lands of the Central Plains and the ethnically 
mixed region of Banat – which the New Europe group 
naturally criticized (The New Europe, Vol. IV, No. 40, 
1917: 5-6). Speaking in the name of the former side, the 
statements of Dumitru Drăghicescu were not hopeful 
with regards to the future. The Romanian politician 
denounced the oppressive policy of the Hungarian 
government in his article Hungary and the non-Magyar 
Peoples (25 April 1918); however, he could have accepted 
the latter in case the Magyars would have constituted an 
absolute majority in their country (The New Europe, Vol. 
VII, No. 80, 1918: 38).
No wonder that various collaborators of the New 
Europe warned the public – and their co-workers – about 
the dangers hiding within the depth of nationalism. With 
his article published right after that of Drăghicescu, 
John Mavrogordato stressed the danger that the clash 
between nations might create hatred and instability 
in the future as well (The New Europe, Vol. VII, No. 80, 
1918: 69). Furthermore, the anonymous author of the 
writing Through Liberation to the New Commonwealth 
(5 September 1918) asserted that the historical lack of 
democratic traditions coupled with the tensions produced 
by the former times of oppression might result in the 
establishment of oppressive systems in Central Europe 
(The New Europe, Vol. VIII, No. 93, 1918: 169-172).
On the other hand, it was inevitable that national 
minorities would exist in the future. No other solution 
was possible due to both the mixed ethnic conditions of 
the area and the need of creating states strong enough to 
oppose the power of the German Reich. Thus, Masaryk 
stressed the importance of economic and strategic factors 
in the with regards to the settlement after the war, aiming 
to create and secure the future of a local nation-state 
9 Seton-Watson, letter to Dr. Rajchman, 28 November 1916. SEW, 
box 6/1, fold. 9.
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himself. However, Seton-Watson was hesitant to accept 
any major compromise of the principle of nationality – as 
a consequence, the Czech politician admittedly tried to put 
this opinion of his in a neutral setting to make it acceptable 
for his Scottish friend.10
The authors of the New Europe worked out two 
solutions for these problems – both based on self-
determination. First of all, the fulfilment of national needs 
was seen as only inter-mediate steps towards the future 
establishment of greater structures. Seton-Watson 
emphasized in his An Open Letter to British Labour (21 
February 1918) that larger local federations could have 
been better solutions on the long run than nation-states 
as they would have inspired the local communities to co-
operate with each other. Surprisingly, the author asserted 
that even Austria–Hungary could be re-created after the 
war – if the former inhabitants make this decision by their 
own will (The New Europe, Vol. VI, No. 71, 1918: 167).
In addition to this, the introduction of 10 October 
1916 already proposed the establishment of minority 
rights as a solution for problems. The author of the 
article La Victoire Intégrale grabbed the main lines of this 
settlement representatively. Firstly, the writer mentioned 
that a system of voluntary migrations could lower the 
quantity of minority groups. In addition to this, future 
nation-states should have accepted and respected civil 
liberties and the cultural rights to the use of national 
language, to worship and education as standards (The 
New Europe, Vol. IV, No. 45, 1917: 228-229).
Besides supra-national federation and minority 
rights, self-determination-based autonomy was also a 
living concept within the New Europe group. It was the 
British historian Arnold J. Toynbee who dealt with all 
these aspects in his memorandum The Draft Treaty of 
Peace (December 1917). The author asserted that the clash 
between various territorial claims and the mixed local 
structures of ethnicity made the complete fulfilment of 
self-determination in Central Europe impossible. As for a 
solution, he proposed that territorial autonomy should be 
guaranteed to those nationalities that could not gain their 
independence due to this phenomenon. Furthermore, 
he also stated that all involved populations should have 
a saying in connection to the question of secession from 
each other. Surprisingly, Toynbee even made a peculiar 
map of the reformed Habsburg Empire, asserting that the 
latter could survive and live on as a federation of Central 
European nations after the war.11 Nonetheless, the ancient 
Monarchy fell apart after 1918 – and the new nation-states 
10  Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 2 November 1916.
11  Toynbee, Arnold J., Draft Treaty of Peace (28 November 1917), 
2–3. SEW, box 2/3 fold. 3.
actually showed those oppressive tendencies towards 
their minorities which the Enlightened authors of the New 
Europe feared so much.
Conclusion
The ‘principle of nationality’, national self-
determination, and as a consequence, the total 
reorganization of the Old Continent – despite them not 
being fresh, the New Europe still upheld these ideas too 
early and in a manner too active for the audiences and 
the governments of Entente until 1918. This resulted in 
a marginalized position, in which the society was in and 
was also held in. On the other hand, the New Europe 
group succeeded in overcoming these difficulties; this 
happened both due to the lucky developments of the 
Great War, but was also a result of hard work. During the 
course of the latter, the association developed a language 
of self-determination earlier and independently from 
the emblematic figures of Lenin and Wilson. This was 
proved by the relationship between the former notion and 
that of the ‘principle of nationality’ in this discourse, the 
connection between which was provided by the influence 
of the First Russian Revolution. Upon this basis, the group 
of the periodical could develop excessive plans in relation 
to the area of ‘Central Europe’ – along with identifying 
problems already during the First World War that proved 
to be determinative as for the period after 1918.
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Sažetak
Bence Bari,  
Od teorije do prakse : Nova Europa i nacionalno 
samoodređenje u Prvom svjetskom ratu (1916.-1920.)
Marginalizirati – postaviti ili svesti nekoga na 
bespomoćnu ili nebitnu poziciju unutar društva ili društvene 
grupe.  Iako ova definicija zvuči zaostalo, čovjek mora imati u 
vidu da je glavni pokretač povijesti - promjena. Upravo zbog 
te činjenice nije iznenađujuće da su mnoge društvene grupe 
koje su prvotno bile marginalizirane uspjele promijeniti 
tijek povijesti. Ovaj se znanstveni rad bavi međunarodnom 
grupom intelektualaca i političara koji su se okupili u 
Velikoj Britaniji za vrijeme (i poslije) Prvog vjetskog rata 
(1916.-1920.). Ovaj pokret je težio rekonstrukciji Starog 
kontinenta (Europe) s obzirom na državne granice, a 
propagiran je terminom nacionalnog  samoodređenja. 
Njihovi revolucionarni ciljevi i stanje u društvu su prvotno 
rezultirali marginaliziranom državom – ali do kraja rata su 
se ideje Nove Europe i nacionalnog samoodređenja proširile 
i imale utjecaj na međuratno razdoblje.
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